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I. Introduction1  
 
“There is no doubt that American cities are in dire straits and in need of a 
remedy“2 
 
 In recent years, with the outbreak of widespread financial crises, hardly 
any other topic keeps politicians, especially in industrialized nations, as busy as 
state financial distress. In the field of law, the issue of how to deal with state 
financial difficulties now and in the near future is discussed worldwide.3 
 The City of Detroit's historic bankruptcy in July 20134, the largest city 
measured by both population and outstanding debt to file for Chapter 9, turned 
the eyes of the American nation and the world to the problems of America's 
struggling post-industrial cities.5 Detroit's 2013 petition can be read as the coda 
to a dramatic yet idiosyncratic tale of economic decline.6 Challenges from 
abroad to the domestic automotive industry, rapid depopulation, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The starting point of this work is the research of the author as part of his doctoral thesis on the 
subject of municipal insolvency capability in Germany (M Hoffmann, Die geordnete gebiets-
körperschaftliche Insolvenz am Beispiel deutscher Kommunen (The orderly insolvency of 
territorial entities using the example of German municipalities), 2012). In the course of this thesis 
the author had the opportunity to consider cursorily the solutions of other jurisdictions. The 
present work is dedicated to deepen the view on the US Chapter 9 proceedings and its 
exemplary character. 
2 O Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy  Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 Yale J. on 
Reg. 351, 352 (hereinafter Kimhi, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 351). 
3 Especially various law review symposia, for example: Widener Law Journal Symposium  
“Bankruptcy and Beyond: Solving the Problem of Municipal Financial Distress“ held on April 14, 
2014 in Harrisburg, Pennsylannia (USA); Symposia at the University of Vienna (Austria): “State 
Insolvency“ held on Mai 10, 2010 and June 21, 2011; Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany): 
“State Insolvency as point of law“ held on April 8, 2011. Whereas 20 years ago the subject of 
municipal bankruptcy had received little attention in the legal literature, MW McConnell / RC 
Picker, “When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy“, 60 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 425, 425 (hereinafter McConnell / Picker, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 425): “This subject is 
apparently of too little practical financial importance to attract the attention of bankruptcy 
scholars.“ 
4 Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of City of Detroit, Michigan's Statement of Qualifications 
Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re City of Detroit, 498 B.R. 776 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich., filed July 18, 2013) (No. 2:13-bk-53846). 
5 “The most dramatic developments have come in the handling of municipal distress“, DA Skeel, 
Is bankruptcy the answer for troubled cities and states?, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 1063, 1064 
(hereinafter Skeel, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 1063). 
6 JM Beermann, Esolving the public pension „crisis“, 41 Fordham Urb. L. J. 999, 999 (hereinafter 




questionable leadership tell a remarkable and discomforting story.7  
 But in many respects the financial problems Detroit faces today are 
similar, maybe currently more pronounced, to the troubles confronting many 
towns and cities across the country.8 In the three years before Detroit filed the 
largest municipal bankruptcy in United States history, several other 
municipalities had done so, including Jefferson County, Alabama9, Harrisburg 
(the capital of Pennsylvania)10 and two California cities, Stockton11 and San 
Bernardino12, each one generating an enormous amount of debts. Suddenly the 
public not just in the United States realized that the financial crisis not only 
affects states as a whole but also the subordinate authorities, especially the 
municipalities. Municipal insolvency scenarios were now no longer only 
hypothetically possible, but part of the reality of life. 
 Although each case mentioned above had its own unique history and 
causes, each municipality filled for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code followed by a subsequent state-supervised recovery. The 
accumulation of these proceedings in the United States more and more draws 
the attention of policy makers in other countries that also have to struggle 
increasingly with municipal financial difficulties. In many jurisdictions, the 
question that comes into focus is to what extent can one resolve municipal 
insolvency scenarios through a legal proceeding and if the US American 
Chapter 9 proceeding can serve as a role model. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 VSJ Buccola, An ex ante approach to excessive state debt, 64 Duke L. J. 235, 236 (hereinafter 
Buccola, 64 Duke L. J. 235). 
8 Buccola, 64 Duke L.J. 235, 236. 
9 B Wright, Jefferson County Files Largest Government Bankruptcy in U.S. History, The 
Birmingham News Bog, available at http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/ll/jefferson_county_files 
_for_lar.html (last accessed: 20/5/2015). 
10 In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (dismissing Harrisburg's 
bankruptcy petition); Walker v. City of Harrisburg, No. 569 M.D. 2011 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 23, 
2013), available at http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-651/file-3053.pdf?cb=8e8741 
(confirming recovery plan for City of Harrisburg, last accessed: 20/5/2015). 
11 See B White, Stockton Files for Bankruptcy Protection, Wall Street Journal 29/6/2012, 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304058404577495412282335228 
(last accessed: 20/5/2015). 
12 See S Church / D McCarthy / M Bathon, San Bernardino, California, Files Chapter 9 
Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG 2/8/2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-




This work is dedicated in the first instance to the necessity of insolvency 
proceedings for municipalities as territorial entities. Therefore, the current 
debate on insolvency proceedings for states is presented briefly in an 
introductory overview to introduce the debate that insolvency proceedings for 
territorial entities has reached all levels of government worldwide. This is 
followed by examples of historical experience with insolvency scenarios of 
states and local authorities to show that insolvency scenarios at all levels of 
government are part of reality, and that a procedural handling is possible, but 
also necessary. 
 Based on this, the US-Chapter 9 procedure, perhaps the most well-known 
legal remedy for insolvent cities13, and the most globaly developed proceeding 
for municipal insolvencies, is taken closer into view. In the first step, the 
principles and mechanisms are pointed out. This is followed by a semantic 
preamble regarding the develeopment of insolvency law and its public 
perception, a short discussion of the experience with the Chapter 9 process and 
last, but not least, a presentation of the key advantages of Chapter 9 
proceedings. The goal is to convey that the Chapter 9 proceeding may serve as 
a useful tool and model for other countries to solve excessive indebtness of 
municipalities. As a result, in particular, the abstract possibilities and objectives 
of the procedure are considered. 
 
1. The current debate about insolvency proceedings for states 
 
"Healthy state finances (are) the first requirement for an orderly development of 
the whole social and political life "14 
 
 In times of the financial and debt crisis, this statement by the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany from 1962 displays more than ever an 
admonishing clarity: "The lesson from the recent crisis can be summed up in two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 O Kimhi, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 351, 352. 




words: sound public finances."15 
 No one is able to continuously spend more than his regular fundings. At 
least in the mid and long term, there is a need that regular income and expenses 
are well-balanced. This applies to the public hand to the same extent as to 
individuals and businesses. Not only in households, but also in almost every 
state, it is now almost "en vogue" to live beyond their means. This has the 
consequence for the public hand that continuously increasing funding gaps must 
be compensated by taking out loans. What happens, however, if the credit load 
and thus the government debt reaches spheres where public finances are no 
longer "healthy" or "solid"? 
 In times of the sovereign debt crisis, several European countries are 
exposed to such a dramatic worsening of their financial problems that the 
remaining member states are forced to provide massive financial support in 
order to prevent the first national bankruptcy in the history of the European 
economic and monetary union. Not only Europe, the United States and Japan 
have also been hopelessly over-indebted. What initially began in 2007 as a 
crisis of the US real estate market now bothered the global community. This 
solidifies the impression that politics is not a means to calm the financial markets 
and get the exploding national debt under control. 
 The sovereign debt crisis reached its peak this year in Greece.16 A 
sovereign debt default, and thus the de facto bankruptcy, could so far only be 
prevented primarily by the joint efforts of the Member States. For nearly six 
years, Greece has been in such a difficult budgetary and financial crisis that it 
could only be saved from insolvency - at least temporarily – by the immense 
financial efforts of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). These days the medium and long-term development of the Greek public 
finances, and thus the future of the European Economic and Monetary Union, is 
decreasingly foreseeable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “Welt am Abgrund“ (“The World on the brink“) p. 71, Der Spiegel 32/2011 (Cover story: “Geht 
die Welt bankrott?“ (“Is the world going bankrupt?“). 
16 L Aldermann, Explaining the Greek Debt Crisis, New York Times (9/4/2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/business/international/explaining-the-greek-debt-crisis.html 




 As part of the current development, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and her Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schaeuble had already in May 2010 
created a new plan of action. They called for the institutionalisation of an 
international insolvency procedure for states for the orderly handling of 
sovereign default scenarios.17 
 Thus, shocks to the global financial system should be better absorbed in 
the future. The international community should no longer be blackmailed to help 
if a country reached the limits of its financial capacity. In addition, a debt 
repayment system should be established, and the reorganisation of the debtor 
country should be placed on a firm foundation. The aim, however, was also to 
establish an institutionalized participation of private creditors in the costs of 
bankruptcy. 
 While the recent financial crisis in Europe does not primarily affect the 
options for addressing state and municipal financial emergencies in the United 
States, it nevertheless has important similarities.18 The European Union's 
handling of the travails of Greece and other distressed European countries, and 
recent suggestions to move toward to a "fiscal union" or to enact a restructuring 
framework, raise questions about the internal dynamics of a structure that also is 
highly important for the  situation in the United States.19 
As confusing as the discussion about the long-term establishment of insolvency 
law for states in the Western world currently may be, it still reignited in 
jurisprudence in the context of the world's exploding national debt.20  
 Although the insolvency capability of territorial entities (countries, states, 
municipalities) seemed to be unthinkable in many countries for a long time, it 
has now been put back on the economic and jurisprudential agenda with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 C Reiermann, Creatig Order in the Euro Zone: Merkels Rules for Bankruptcy, Der Spiegel, 
12/7/2010, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/creating-order-in-the-euro-
zone-merkel-s-rules-for-bankruptcy-a-705959-2.html (last accessed: 15/5/2015). 
18 Skeel, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 1063, 1065. In fact, a number of academics and political figures in the 
US have urged the Congress also to permit states to restructure or otherwise shed debt through 
a formal, federal bankruptcy process modeled on Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. A series of 
op-eds has made the case in the popular press. Meanwhile, law reviews have witnessed the 
growth of what one commentator dubs a "cottage industry" devoted to debating the merits and 
design of a state-bankruptcy regime, cf. Buccola, 64 Duke L.J. 235, 237 with further reference in 
n9 and n10. 
19 Skeel, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 1063, 1065. 




recent financial crisis. This generates a corresponding discussion as it was last 
seen in the context of the Argentine crisis at the beginning of the millennium. 
 
2. Insolvencies of territorial entities - a historical overview 
 
 Not only in the European and national context, but especially in the sub-
national context, there was a lively scientific discussion on the establishment 
and improvement of insolvency proceedings for territorial entities in the recent 
years.21 For Germany, the historical focus need not be directed to other 
countries in terms of the insolvency of public authorities. Germany already has 
enough examples in history as starting points. The fact of bankruptcy both at the 
local level and in the form of a two-time national bankruptcy (the third, the 
German Democratic Republic, not counted) after the First and Second World 
Wars was already implemented several times. Looking farther back into the 
history of territorial entity insolvency at the local level, the bankruptcy of the 
Prussian city Halle in 1717, the bankruptcy of the East Prussian city Arys in 
1929 and in the same year the bankruptcy of the Saxon town of Glashütte has to 
be mentioned. These examples demonstrate that bankruptcy of territorial entities 
in Germany has been a long established reality. 
 
a. Bankruptcies of a State 
 
"Governments talk about it just as reluctantly as the modern world is talking 
about dying; nevertheless it has to happen once in a while."22 
 
 Kratzmann stated the real existence of the alleged phenomenon of state 
bankruptcy in the year 1982 with just a few words sounding similarly threatening 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Especially in Germany, there is a comprehensive discussion in law since the start of the 
financial crisis. Comprehensively this discussion is presented by the author himself, M 
Hoffmann, The orderly insolvency of territorial entities using the example of German 
municipalities, 2012. In addition, the latest publication in a scientific law journal can be found at 
CG Paulus, Gemeinden und Insolvenzrecht: eine nützliche Allianz (Municipalities and Insolvency 
Law: A beneficial Alliance), ZInsO 2014, 2464 et. sqq. 




and ultimate as "national bankruptcy". But it is likely that the issue of excessive 
indebtedness of states and the corresponding attempts to escape the burden of 
debt through the bankruptcy of the state are as old as the history of the states 
themselves.23 Moreover, history shows that most countries can recover after 
their financial ruin, even if the causes of state defaults are many. 
 According to the Vice President of the International Monetary Fund in 
2002, Anne Krueger, the issue of state insolvency or excessive indebtedness 
has occurred in about 90 cases worldwide in the last 200 years.24 Contrary to 
what one might suspect, this not only affected the so-called developing 
countries, but also the majority of European countries. Some of them actually 
have admitted to being unable to meet their liability dutifully several times. 
The present study cannot and does not want to make the claim of a 
comprehensive or detailed discussion of the history of the state insolvency 
scenarios. The aim of this short presentation is to show that state insolvency 
scenarios are not isolated phenomena, but part of the possible financial reality of 




 The case of state insolvency in the 21st century that has received the 
most attention in scientific, political and public forums, is the Argentina crisis 
from the years 2001 to 2002. The case of Argentina is the largest to date in 
terms of the volume of state defaults. The country was confronted in 1999 with 
significant economic problems that should have been solved with the help of 
government bonds. After the complete collapse of the peso, combined with 
violent social riots and the onset of massive capital flight, Argentina finally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Currently, in particular, the US economy professors Reinhart and Rogoff are dealing with the 
recurring phenomenon of state bankruptcy. The authors demonstrate on the basis of extensively 
evaluated records from eight centuries that the processes are essentially the same, CM Reinhart 
/ K Rogoff, This times is different: Eight centuries of financial folly, 2009. 
24 A Krueger, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, 
Speech Before Institute for International Economics at the Conference on "Sovereign Debt 
Workouts: Hopes and Hazards" (Apr. 1, 2002), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm (last accessed: 20/5/2015). 
25 For a detailed survey, please refer to M Hoffmann, The orderly insolvency of territorial entities 




refused to fulfill its obligations under international bonds. Overall, this was an 
amount of more than 80 billion euros and 20 billion euros in unpaid interest. It 
was the largest bankruptcy ever and involved 500,000 creditors – bank, 
institutional investors and, mostly European, private investors. 
 With the Act of 6 January 2002, the Argentine parliament declared a 
public emergency and authorized the executive branch to reform the exchange 
rate system and the restructuring of the existing external debt. Excluded from 
the suspension payments were only those debts that were under Argentine law. 
It was not until the beginning of 2005 that Argentina submitted a final debt 
restructuring offer to its creditors which meant a loss of 75% of the nominal 




 Iceland had to nationalise the three largest banks in the country (Glitnir, 
Kaupthing and Landsbanki) in 2008 after they had speculated with sums that 
exceeded the economic performance of the country many times. On 16 October 
2008, the Government of Iceland announced that it was not able to repay a bond 
to the Glitnir Bank in the amount of 750 million US dollars. The following 
Monday, the interest payment for a bond of Kaupthing Bank, nearly 500 million 
US dollars, remained open to two investors. The onset of insolvency was only a 
matter of time26 and even the Icelandic Prime Minister warned of an impending 
bankruptcy.27 But the collapse of Iceland was turned away in November of the 
same year, as the International Monetary Fund approved a grant over 2.1 billion 
dollars and the countries of Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden pledged 
loans to Iceland in the amount of 2.5 billion US dollars. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 "Iceland is bankrupt," said Arsaell Valfells, a professor at the University of Iceland. "The 
Icelandic krona is history. The IMF has to come and rescue us.", E Pfanner, The New York 
Times, (9/10/2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/ 
business/worldbusiness/09iht-icebank.4.16827672.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last accessed: 
19/5/2015). 
27 Prime Minister Geir Haarde, warned of the threat of "national bankruptcy," E Pfanner, The 
New York Times (9/10/2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/ 









 The latest example in terms of (impending) state insolvency scenarios in 
the European Union is the already mentioned Greek crisis. The threat of 
bankruptcy could be averted only by repeated, massive financial support from 
the EU and the IMF. In the short term, while an attempt is made to defuse the 
financial crisis in Greece, it remains to be seen whether this will be achieved in 
the medium and long-term point of view. The relevant assessments can be 
referred to as split - at least in politics and business. While some people in 
politics cling to the hope of being able to save Greece with another massive 
financial support and not jeopardise the stability of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, rating agencies primarily warn of a Greek default which causes strong 
difficulties within Europe's politicians.28 Greece's creditworthiness could, the 
rating agencies say, be equal with a bankrupt state if private creditors have to 




 Unlike Greece, the United States always received top marks from rating 
agencies and therefore an excellent credit rating. However, the government had 
to take loans in the value of a trillion dollars for economic stimulus and back 
bailouts as a result of the financial crisis. Hardly any country in the world 
currently lives beyond its means as much as the United States. At the end of 
2015, the total government outstanding debt of the United States, including 
federal, state and local, is estimated to be almost 21.7 trillion US dollars. As a 
result, the total national debt in 2014 is higher (103%) than the total economic 
output (GDP) a year.  Even in 1981, the figure stood at just 26.3%. In Germany, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For current discussion about the power of rating agencies and the dangers of its supposed 
sovereignty of interpretation in the context of the financial crisis see Patrick Kingsley, How rating 






it is currently at 81%. Accordingly, the US annual government deficit in 2011 
with 10.6% of the total economic output reached a figure more than three times 
higher than the predicted example for Germany of 3.3%. In 2011 it was actually 
forbidden by law for the government to get into debt with more than at least 14.3 
trillion US dollars. Only a month-long negotiated compromise with the opposition 
made a raising of the debt ceiling at the last moment possible. If this increase 
had not been made, it would have been the first default in US history in early 
August 2011. 
 The massive financial problems of the most powerful economy in the 
world have  by no means been eliminated with the increase of the authorized 
debt limit. Even in a decade, some scholars fear that the total debt would have 
doubled if the state, as in the past, spends one to two trillion dollars a year more 
than it earns. As a result, due to the described development, the rating agency 
Standard & Poor's, one of the three major international rating agencies, lowered 
the outlook for its rating in April 2011 initially to "negative", then deprived the US 
in early August 2011 of the highest grade "AAA" and warned of a further 
downgrade at the same time. The agency justified its step by pointing out that 
the measures adopted a few days earlier would be insufficient for a sustainable 
fiscal consolidation and also questioned the predictability of American policy 
processes because of the protracted dispute between the US government and 
opposition.29 The loss of the top score also represents, besides higher interest 
rates for borrowing and thus higher costs for the state budget, a sensitive 
prestige loss. For supposedly stable economies state insolvency scenarios are 
no bugbear, but in times of global financial crises, shades of the reality of life for 
public finance. 
 
dd) Interim findings 
 
 Past and present show that sovereign defaults are not uncommon and 
are usually not synonymous with the destruction of a State. In a number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Standard & Poors press release (5/8/2011), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 




cases, they lead rather to the rescue of the state. It must therefore be clearly 
noted that that the concept of State's ability to pay is more than a bare 
metaphor. History shows rather that the government's ability to pay has an 
actual, real existing restriction. Consequently, in the history of sovereign debt, 
there is hardly a country in which a sovereign default, in some form, has not 
already occurred, and many states have often lived through this scenario.  
 A relevant lesson must be at this point that politics and science no longer 
have to be afraid of the word "bankruptcy" in particular, and of the insolvencies 
of territorial entities in general. Notwithstanding the large experience of 
sovereign defaults in the 19th and 20th centuries, there is no successful 
approach - on the state level - to develop an adequate method for dealing with 
such a situation to the present day. 
 
b) Subnational insolvencies 
 
 The insolvency of subnational governments is a recurring phenomenon of 
legal history. However, in many countries regulatory structures for dealing with 
relevant insolvency scenarios can be found on a subnational level which is 
different than in the event of state insolvencies. The best known example of this 
is the so-called Chapter 9 process in the United States of America, and its 
representation will be the focus of the present survey. In addition, one can also 
find such proceedings in other countries, including Brazil, Hungary, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania and South Africa.30 Based on three selected examples, in a 
first instance the skepticism of the organized solution of subnational payment 
crises will be alleviated in each of these cases discussed below. 
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flesh out basic concepts and  highlight transferable features. Simultanously they “draw lessons 




aa) The case of the Saxon town of Glashütte (Germany) 
 
 In the discussion about a possible bankruptcy ability of German 
municipalities, it is mostly accessed to corresponding regulations in other 
jurisdictions. It is often ignored that German history provides examples of 
municipal bankruptcy. In particular, it is worth looking at the case of the Saxon 
town of Glashütte from 1929, at least insofar as the authoritative judgment of the 
Supreme Administrative Court Saxon31 was understood as "an administrative 
decision of the utmost importance“.32 
 Also, in the case of Glashütte there was not just one stand-alone factor: 
there were a series of causes, problems and failures that were crucial to the 
financial decline. Thus, the entire territory of the German Empire was greatly 
impacted by the precarious financial position. After the end of inflation, 
borrowing was supposedly the only way to make the necessary investments 
because the citizens could not be utilised more intensively after the end of the 
economic crisis. Very quickly, the municipalities lacked the means to shoulder 
the burden of interest payments on the loans.  
 The town of Glashütte was also affected by other individual burdens. The 
traditional watchmaking and industrial city had to cope with the decline of the 
watch industry and therefore rising social costs, which rose further by a flood 
disaster in 1927. In addition, local failures came along through lending to non-
urban farms, which in turn had to be financed by borrowing. The result was that 
at some point, an interest repayment of the loans was no longer possible. The 
city had recently accumulated a total debt of two million Reichsmark. This led to 
the bankruptcy petition of the town of Glashütte by the City Council in March 
1929 and to the determination of insolvency and over-indebtedness by the 
Ministry of the Interior in June 1929.	  The opening of the bankruptcy proceedings 
against the disposable took place on 10 July 1929. 
 The result of municipal bankruptcy proceedings was that creditors and 
debtors  were finally able to reach a compromise of debt rescheduling and 
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interest waiver on one side, and the liquidation of municipal assets on the other. 
With the suspension of the bankruptcy proceedings on 1 December 1931, the 
town of Glashütte was given the opportunity for a fresh start. 
 
bb) The case Leukerbad (Wallis/Switzerland) 
 
 The most memorable and probably most recent example of the actual 
insolvency of a municipality in Europe is the case of Leukerbad in Switzerland.33 
Debts of 346 million Swiss francs had been accumulated within a decade by the 
end of 1998 as a result of massive investment and mismanagement. The tourist 
resort of Leukerbad, with just 1,750 residents had to adjudge itself insolvent as 
the first Swiss community since the enactment of the Federal Law on Debt 
Collection against municipalities of 1947. From 1999 to February 2004 
Leukerbad was under sequestration as the first Swiss municipality.34 
 Although the creditors and the municipality of Leukerbad itself wanted to 
commit the canton of Valais to vouch for the outstanding payments, this request 
was rejected by four judgments of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.35 
According to the court, the  governmental supervision has the aim to protect the 
municipality and not the creditors. In this case, the principle of autonomy is 
relevant - a clear decision against a possible "bailout" by the next higher level of 
government. The lender thereby awakened from a "century long hibernation“ 
and thus had to - but without carrying out a formal insolvency proceedings – 
resign from parts of their debts (between 30 and 78%). In return, Leukerbad had 
to come to terms with the liquidation of parts of their assets. As part of the 
receivership, the expenditure was also reduced, and taxes on the maximum 
allowable increased and investments were partially released for liquidation. The 
population decreased from 1,750 to 1,400, ie by 20%. After 2003, a cantonal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The events in the case Leukerbad can be thereby largely been reconstructed out of the four 
judgments of the Swiss Federal Tribunal of 3 July 2003, 2C.4 / 1999, 2c.5 / 1999 2C.4 / 2000 
and 2C.1 / 2001. 
34 The execution against public authorities of the cantonal law and local authorities, is regulated 
in Switzerland by the SchGG, "Federal law on debt collection against municipalities and other 
corporations under public cantonal law". It is assisted by the "Federal Law on Debt Collection 
and Bankruptcy" (SchKG). 




"bailout" was finally rejected and all of the assets of the municipality were sold 
(especially tourism infrastructure). 
 However, these experiences resulted in a rethinking of the lenders and a 
complete reorganisation of the markets for local authority loans. They now pay 
increased attention to the creditworthiness of the authorities. The capital market 
meets again its very own function by higher interest rates for higher risks. The 
municipality of Leukerbad itself has in its publicly available and extremely 
transparent "Financial Report & Financial Statements 2013" a debt of 192 million 
Swiss francs.36 While this is an enormously large sum, this is still about 165 
million Swiss francs lower than another 15 years before. The current income of 
12.9 million Swiss francs offsets by a current expense of 11.6 million Swiss 
francs.  According to that, the self-generated funds (cash flow) are 1.3 million 
Swiss francs. 
 Due to the restructuring contract, the municipality is still not allowed to 
take out loans from third parties. For this reason, the municipality must finance 
their investments from their own resources. However, despite these massive 
restrictions, the municipality is on the right track into the future. 
 
cc) The case of Orange Country (California/USA) 
 As already mentioned, the insolvency proceedings for municipalities (so-
called Chapter 9 process) in the USA is regulated by law since 1937.37 Its 
greatest achievement is that so far it has rarely been used by municipalities. 
However, critical stardom, in particular the case of Orange County, California, 
has acquired in 1994.38 The Chapter 9 process of Orange County was the 
largest insolvency proceeding in the history of municipal bankruptcy in the 
United States in terms of financial volume until 2013 when Detroit filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9. Under nominal debt of 7.6 billion US dollars by 
speculation a loss in value of 1.64 billion US dollars had been caused. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Available at www.leukerbad.org (last accessed: 20/5/2015). 
37 Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (“Chandler Act), 50 Stat. 654 (1937), amending the 1898 US 
Bankruptcy Act. 
38   F Tung, “After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy  Law“, 53 




 A trigger for the insolvency proceedings was governmental funding 
restrictions on long-term bonds, which meant that these were offset by short-
term and risky loans. There were also declining tax revenues together with rising 
expenditures, a well known phenomenon. But ultimately crucial was certainly a 
variety of "soft" factors, such as lack of policy coordination, voter distrust and 
government mismanagement. After initially chaotic conditions due to the petition 
for insolvency proceedings in December 1994, an insolvency plan was 
submitted in December 1995 and the process came to conclusion in June 1996. 
 Sharp budget cuts and significant staff reductions were required in order 
to advance its budget reorganisation and to perform the debt service. Though 
the complexity of this concrete proceeding in the case of Orange County's bans 
a detailed explanation herein, the focus of this work will be the explanation of the 
general conditions and the aims and advantages of the American Chapter 9 
process.39 At this point it should only be noted that already more than 500 US 
communities took the road through an orderly insolvency procedure in the past.  
 But even in the present, as a result of the economic downturn there are 
many financially strickened US cities and municipalities or associations on the 
verge of bankruptcy or have already declared their inability to pay. For example, 
the National League of Cities has already explained in the spring of 2010 that 
the American municipalities by the year 2012 will probably have to cope with a 
budget deficit of up to 83 billion US dollars - a wave of municipal bankruptcies 
was feared between 2010 and 2020. 
 As already mentioned above, this has already occurred not just in a 
variety of small towns such as Westfall in Pennsylvania40, but also in Detroit, 
which filed the largest municipal bankruptcy in United States history, and several 
other municipalities including Jefferson County, Harrisburg (the capital of 
Pennsylvania) and two California cities, Stockton and San Bernardino, each one 
generating an enormous amount of debts. But among the possible bankruptcy 
candidates, you also find some more well-known cities such as Miami and Los 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For more details compare Frederick Tung, 53 Hastings L.J. 885. 
40 Jeremy Boren / Brad Bumsted, “Too many towns, too much debt: Welcome to Pennsylvania“, 
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review 21/3/2010, available at http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib 




Angeles. Miami is facing such big financial problems that they are considering 
whether to declare themselves bankrupt. The situation is even worse in Los 
Angeles, where it is expected that the city must declare itself insolvent at the 
latest in one or two years, as the pension obligations of the city have reached a 
overwhelming amount - more than half of the available funds will be applied for 
this purpose – and further increase of 2.5 billion US dollars is expected in the 
coming years. As the the second largest city in the USA, Los Angeles already 
has to shoulder a budget shortfall of 500 million US dollars annually.41 
 
dd) Interim findings 
 
 The historical reality has very little in common with the image of a 
community with inexhaustible financial power. Rather, the history of almost 
every state is characterised by the history of its crises and thus its financial 
crisis. Therefore insolvency scenarios belong, as shown in the illustrated 
historical experience, on all levels of government to the reality of life of the past 
and the present. 
 For a variety of municipialities there is the danger - not only, but also - 
due to the financial crisis, to get into the de facto bankruptcy. This can usually 
be prevented only by a strenuous consolidation effort. The sellout of municipal 
assets has already begun, services are canceled, and the staff and 
administration costs are drastically reduced. While this in many ways may result 
in quite positive and acceptable effects, many local authorities nevertheless see 
themselves no longer in a position for further cost-cutting measures. However, 
the legal history also shows at the local level that a regulated bankruptcy 
proceeding usually is an instrument for the turnaround. Therefore, it is worth the 
effort to restabilise municipalities on a financial basis and thus to create the 
chance for a new start. 
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3. The necessity of insolvency proceedings for municipalities –  
Chapter 9 as a model 
 
 It doesn`t satisfy the importance of this debate by locating it in the context 
of historical experience alone. In reality, many cities and towns, especially in the 
last years, are standing on the edge of financial collapse. Many municipalities 
are at the end of their ability to act and there are growing fears of frequent 
occurrences of municipal defaults. Moreover, considering the long-term 
development of municipal budgets, it can be assumed that the process of 
collective municipal insolvency scenarios is only at its beginning. The financial 
crisis of the affected communities is based not only on simple mismanagement 
and unsustainable living beyond their means, but also on the congestion of local 
authorities by federal and state governments, especially due to increased 
allocation of financial intensive tasks without the insuring of adequate funding. 
Taking the insolvency of public authorities in this focus, this is first of all 
not a phenomenon of the state level. Much more natural is a look at the 
municipal insolvency which illustrates the framework of public insolvency 
scenarios in the past and present. The local governments are in fact the 
authorities which been hit hard by the current financial crisis - more and more 
becoming a debt crisis of public budgets. The municipal insolvency, and thus the 
threat of municipal bankruptcy, is no more an extraordinary phenomenon. 
 Consequently, the citizens will encounter first on this lowest "state" level 
insolvency related consolidation measures and spending cuts. A bankruptcy as 
a comprehensive debt default, which probably currently still seems rather 
unlikely in most of the countries at the state level, is imminent - not just 
occasionally - at the local level. 
Experience shows that municipalities can become insolvent. But the lack of a 
formal insolvency proceedings in many countries for public authorities turns a 
insolvency into a debt trap with no way out. 
 
“When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same 
manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open 




dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor”42 
 
 Already in 1776, the Scottish professor of moral theology Adam Smith 
suggested the introduction of a bankruptcy procedure for states. However, there 
is a pressing need worldwide for an effective approach of insolvency 
proceedings for municipalities. Commonly, the US-american Chapter 9 
proceedings of the Bankruptcy Code is used as a procedural model.  
 
 
II. Overview of the principles of the Chapter 9 procedure 
 
 In the jurisprudential discussion of the perspectives of a municipal 
bankruptcy,  the comparison with the insolvency of public authorities in the 
United States with special reference to the so-called Chapter 9 proceeding plays 
a considerable role. The Bankruptcy Code provides in Chapter 9, the provisions 
for the performance of a debt settlement process for public debtors.43 It is an 
insolvency proceeding, in which the legal status of the debtor is given special 
consideration.44  
 
1. Guiding principles of the procedure 
 
 The regulatory framework is exclusively dedicated to the handling of 
public debtors in bankruptcy. Deeply rooted in the American legal tradition, this 
proceeding has been practiced since 1937, when it was adopted in response to 
rife municipal defaults during the Great Depression.45 Close references are to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, p. 930. 
43 A complete description of the process appears difficult because Chapter 9, as it is usual in the 
American legal system, is only very slightly abstract formulated, but is instead focused on the 
provisions of various case variations. 
44 General explanations on Chapter 9 for example at D Dubrow, The Urban Lawyer 1992, 439; D 
Kupetz, The Urban Lawyer 1995, 531; JB Stuart, Journal of Commercial Lending 1995, 46. 
45 Already in 1934 a proceeding (L. No. Pub. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934)) was attempted by the US 
Congress in the wake of the Great Depression set up to handle local financial crises. However, 
this failed to constitutional concerns of the US Supreme Court (Aston vs. Cameron County 
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 US 513 (1936). Only in 1937, a renewed attempt of the US 
Congress was successful, the relevant law withstood the judicial review of the Supreme Court 
(United States vs. Bekins, 304 US 27 (1938) and entered into force. Only in 1946, the law, which 




the well known Chapter 11 proceedings of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
regulates the reorganisation in the form of an insolvency plan. Nevertheless, the 
Chapter 9 proceeding has a slightly different orientation. Although also a plan-
proceeding, the goal of the chapter 9 proceeding is not just reorganisation but 
also adjustment of debts.46 
 This is due to the fact that the core of a comprehensive reorganisation, as 
already illustrated by the term, is always requiring a significant redesign and 
reorganisation of the respective debtor. But a comprehensive reorganisation 
would result in unacceptable and profound intervention in the personal 
responsibility of the municipality. Accordingly, there are other problems in the 
context of the insolvency of public debtors than in a private law insolvency. The 
protection of territorial autonomy of the debtor and the public interest in 
maintaining the capacity of the debtor is also to be mentioned. Therefore, the 
theme of the procedure under Chapter 9 cannot be just the total reorganisation 
of the municipal debtor, but rather the comprehensive settlement of debts. 
 By means of the Chapter 9 proceeding, the public debtor is given the 
possibility to run through insolvency proceedings with a discharge of residual 
debt and thus the chance of a restart ("fresh start") at the end. A warranty 
obligation of the relevant state for the debts of its municipalities is not required 
by law in the United States.47 In cases where the state refuses voluntary help, 
the Chapter 9 proceeding offers the debtor the option of using their own 
resources to find a way out of the financial crisis.  
 Fundamental challenges during the process are to maintain the debtor's 
ability to act and thus ensure the public exercise of functions of the municipality. 
This is taken into account with the extensive standstill of the proceeding 
("automatic stay") right from the opening of the proceedings.48 As a result, the 
public debtor is protected against the uncontrolled access of creditors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bankruptcy Code ). It is still, of course, taking into account a variety of changing laws, enshrined 
there in law. Cf. the legislative history of chapter 9 at Liu / Waibel, Subnational Insolvencies, p. 5 
et. sqq.; Kimhi, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 351, 362 et. sqq. 
46 Tung, 53 Hastings L.J. 885, 893. 
47 MW McConnell / RC Picker, Municipal Bankruptcies – how to handle a Chapter 9 from start to 
finish (1995), p. 15, 54 et. sqq. (hereinafter MCConnell / Picker, Municipal Bankruptcies). 




Simultaneously, a status quo is created for the elaboration of an insolvency plan. 
 The aim of the Chapter 9 proceedings is the financial rehabilitation of 
public debtors associated with the ongoing maintenance of the fulfillment of their 
essential tasks.49 Accordingly, the municipal debtor is subject to far fewer 
restrictions in comparison to the debtor of Chapter 11 proceedings and is much 
more easily enabled to obtain the approval of the responsible court for the 
elaboration of an insolvency plan and continuing municipal activities. This of 
course comes at the expense of the opportunities for  participation of the 
creditors on the restructuring process and the elaboration of the plan. This 
measure is justified by the special constitutional position of the public debtor, 
whose task is not merely to making profits, but the performance of public 
obligations. 
However, there is according to US legal conception, at least 
psychologically, a comparability between municipal and private insolvency. In 
the absence of a discharge of residual debt, the debtor would stop quickly its 
economic productivity if he has to submit all of his income to his creditors. But if 
he is disburdened from his debt, it is hoped that he can actively participate in 
economic life again.50 This motivational set is also used for the municipalities as 
a justification for granting a discharge of residual debt.51 It is believed that the 
financial burden initially results in tax increases. If the tax burden is too high, the 
lack of motivation presented above occurs within the citizens.52	  This should be 
prevented inter alia by the Chapter 9 proceedings 
 
 
2. Essential regulatory content in broad terms 
 
 The proceedings of Chapter 9 can be divided into three sets of provisions 
- the regulation of the general rules is followed by the rules which regulate the 
actual procedure itself, and finally the insolvency plan rules. Add to that the first 
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50 Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy (1992), p. 27 et. sqq. 
51 McConell / Picker, Municipal Bankruptcies, P. 82. 




rule of Chapter 9, Sec. 901 BC, which regulates which rules in addition to 
Chapter 1 (according to Sec. 103 (f) BC always full appllication), from the 
general provisions in Chapter 3 and 5, but especially from the Chapter 11 
process, come to application. Finally Sec. 902 BC provides some basic 
definitions in view of the proceedings under Chapter 9. 
 
a) Initiation of the proceedings (“Petition filling requirements“53) 
 
 In accordance with Sec. 109 (c) (2) BC, basically each municipality is 
entitled to the demands of the Chapter 9 proceedings.54 This includes both 
"government units" and "Instrumentalities of a state", see Sec. 101 (40) BC, 
therefore subnational public authorities as well as and irrigation districts, school 
districts, state hospitals, etc.55 
The application for the opening of the proceedings may be made only on 
a voluntary basis and only by the debtor itself.56 An application at the initiative of 
the creditors or even the higher state is therefore not possible, Sec. 109 (c) (4) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 McConnell / Picker, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 425, 455 et. sqq. 
54 Section 109(c) provides that: 
(c) An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity -- 
(1) is a municipality; 
(2) is generally authorized to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental 
officer or 
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such 
chapter; 
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(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and 
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55 “The states themselves do not have a bankruptcy option, no matter how bleak their 
circumstances may be. In 2010, a brief discussion erupted as to whether Congress should erect 
some kind of restructuring framework for financially distressed states. At the end, both 
Democrats and Republicans rejected the idea although for quite different reasons...“ Skeel, 50 
Hous. L. Rev. 1063, 1064. 




BC in conjunction with Sec. 301 and 303 BC.57 According to Sec. 109 (c) (4) BC, 
the declared ambition of the application must be to draw and implement a plan 
for debt restructuring. This must be evident in the application. This is to ensure 
that the Chapter 9 proceedings is sought solely for this and not for other 
reasons. 
 Another requirement for a permissible application is stated in Sec. 109 (c) 
(5) BC by way of a set of requirements, which, however, must only be 
alternatively met. The first possible condition is the approval of a simple majority 
(measured by the debt volume) of each class of creditors affected by a 
bankruptcy plan within the meaning of Chapter 9. Since the debt restructuring 
under Chapter 9 will be mostly associated with debt waivers, it is hardly 
surprising that this possibility is in practice hardly significant. If such consent, 
therefore, cannot be achieved, the municipality must have seriously and 
honestly tried to work out a extrajudicial plan to organize the debts with the 
creditors in a preliminary negotiation, or credibly demonstrate that such a 
preliminary hearing is impractical.  
 Another way to initiate the procedure without requiring the consent of the 
majority of the creditors is the reasonable assumption of the municipal debtor, 
that a creditor is seeking an impermissible favoritism of his claim, for example by 
the transfer of rights in rem. This is to ensure that the process of Chapter 9 is 
taken only as a last resort, having exhausted all less restrictive measures, 
including extrajudicial solutions. 
In addition, the applicant must be authorized by law or specific consent of an 
authorized public official of the particular state to submit a debtor to the 
proceedings of Chapter 9 - here is the crucial link between the Bankruptcy Code 
as federal law and relevant regulations of the individual states.58 
 Material condition for the initiation of the proceedings is the insolvency of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 11 USC § 303(a) (limiting involuntary petitions to cases under Chapter 7 or 11). 
58 There are several models: While some states expressly deny the municipalities to apply by 
law, there are other states that have explicitly allowed it. In the majority of cases, however, the 
consent of the individual state must be obtained prior to application, cf. J Cohen, Declining 
health of U.S. Cities raises new interest in chapter 9 (1991), National law journal, 15 et. sqq.; 
EW Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem With Chapter 9 Eligibility— A Proposal to Amend 




the municipal debtor. The decisive criterion for this is the so-called "cash flow 
insolvency test". Thus, it is necessary that the municipality either is not able to 
pay current (undisputed) liabilities by due date or can not pay future liabilities, 
Sec. 109 (c) (3) BC in connection with Sec. 101 (32) BC. Unlike other 
proceedings, the indebtedness is therefore neither necessary nor an 
independent cause for insolvency. This means that already with regard to the 
insolvency cause, some access restriction is made. If the borrowing posibilities 
are not exhausted completely and are therefore liquidity constraints not to be 
expected in the near future, the initiation of the Chapter 9 proceedings is not 
possible. This means that a more or less abstract threat of insolvency cannot be 
considered as an insolvency reason. 
 
b) Consequences of the Initiation 
 
 If, in accordance with Sec. 921 (c) and (d) BC, the proceedings are 
initiated by the bankruptcy court of the relevant judicial district, the already 
mentioned "automatic stay" occurs by law (Sec. 362 BC in connection with Sec. 
922 BC). This “automatic stay“ causes an extensive standstill of the proceedings 
and thus makes the simple enforcement of creditors into insolvency assets 
impossible. This is one of the key legal consequences of the approved 
application and fulfills a double protection function: the debtor is at least 
temporarily relieved from the (impending) access of creditors and gets the 
necessary time to develop a corresponding insolvency plan. But also the body of 
creditors is protected from access by individual creditors into the debtor's 
insolvency assets.59  
 Despite the opening of proceedings by the court, the supervision of the 
debtor remains with the particular state. In addition, the court may not intervene 
without the consent of the municipal entity in its political responsibilities or 
powers of administration, its assets or its income, cf. Sec. 90360 and 90461 BC.62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For more details compare Tung, 53 Hastings L.J. 885, 893 - 894. 
60 § 903. Reservation of State power to control municipalities 
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a 




Unlike  Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, there is no setting up of a “trustee" or external 
auditor. The municipal debtor must therefore continue to manage its assets itself 
and shall also be entitled to continue to incur debts, Sec. 364c BC et. sqq.. The 
court, which plays a central role in the proceeding under Chapter 7 (liquidation) 
or Chapter 11 (reorganisation process) has in the Chapter 9 proceedings only a 
very limited room for maneuver.63 
 In court, it remains to monitor the maintenance or withdrawal of executory 
contracts of the debtor, to monitor the compliance of a possible new 
indebtedness with existing standards and debt rescheduling agreements, and 
especially to agree to the debt settlement plan submitted by the municipality and 
to monitor or reject it. Finally, the court retains jurisdiction through the 
termination of the proceedings. 
 
c) Insolvency assets 
 
 A key question also for insolvency under Chapter 9 is which assets are 
insolvency assets. This is not clearly defined by law, because Sec. 901 BC does 
not refer to key provisions Sec. 541 – 543 BC in this regard. By contrast, Sec. 
902 (1) BC, however states, that the assets of the municipal debtor are 
insolvency assets in the Chapter 9 proceedings. In the first instance all the 
assets of the debtor seem to be avaiable for liquidation. 
 However, limitations arise primarily from the extensive case law. Here, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but 
(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may 
not bind any creditor 
that does not consent to such composition; and 
(2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not consent to such 
composition. 
61 § 904. Limitation on jurisdiction and powers of court 
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides, the 
court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere with 
(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; 
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or 
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property. 
62 Background are the decisions Ashton and Bekins of the Supreme Court, regarding to them the 
10th Amendment urge that during a Chapter-9 process the municipality remains in control of  its 
government affairs. 




distinction is made between generally available assets, related to the economic 
activity of the municipality and generally unavailable assets, which are dedicated 
to the public functions and activities. This differentiation is based on the 
objective of the Chapter 9 proceedings: the debtor should be offered the 
possibility of debt adjustment while maintaining its public functions. Thus, in 
practice, only those assets are available that cannot be associated with a public 
interest or public use. 
 In addition, the municipal debtor remains almost fully in control of the 
proceedings under Chapter 9. He elaborates the insolvency plan, and thus sets - 
within the specified limits - even the framework for the available assets. The 
possibilities of exercising influence of the creditors, but also of the court, are 
very limited. For that reason, the liquidation of assets, which serves the public 
exercise of functions, is virtually eliminated. 
 
d) Insolvency plan 
 
 “The heart of the Chapter 9“64 proceedings is the so called „insolvency 
plan“- or more precise - the debt adjustment plan. A total of eight rules of  the 
Chapter 11 proceedings will be applied (cf. Sec. 901 BC) and are concretised or 
adjusted to the specific needs of a municipal insolvency proceedings by Sec. 
941 to 946 BC. Comparable to the Chapter 11 plan proceedings, the 
proceedings are divided into three phases by Chapter 9: Elaboration of the plan, 
vote by the affected creditor groups and finally the confirmation by the court. 
 The right of initiative, as previously mentioned, remains with the debtor, 
Sec. 941 BC. It thus is an exclusive right of the municipal debtor. In addition, the 
municipal debtor has considerable more time to prepare the reorganisation plan, 
as is the case in the Chapter 11 proceedings. The municipality can also carry 
out any amendments until the confirmation of the plan, Sec. 942 BC. The 
inclusion of creditors in the elaboration of the plan is provided at no time; 
however, the plan must meet certain procedural and substantive requirements 
that result from the applicable standards of Chapter 11 and special standards of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





 The creditors who are affected by the plan draft of the municipality must 
be divided into groups according to similar claims. The result of this 
classification is that all claims are treated equally within the same group, except 
the affected creditor agrees expressly to different treatment with a negative 
impact, Sec. 1123 (a) (3) and (4) BC. In the same groups then, the vote on the 
insolvency plan prepared by the municipality is carried out. The group formation 
is a crucial element in the insolvency plan and thus for the success or failure of 
the entire Chapter 9 process, cf. Sec. 1122-1124 BC. Before the plan is 
confirmed by the court, it is to be submited to the creditors together with a so-
called "disclosure statement" fo a vote, cf. Sec. 1125 BC. The latter refers to a 
written disclosure of the financial circumstances of the municipal debtor which 
serves the creditors to form an opinion with regard to the voting on the 
insolvency plan. The successful vote on the plan, which takes place only within 
the respective groups, and requires, in accordance with Sec. 1126 (c) BC 
generally, the approval of a simple head majority and a sum total majority of two 
thirds of the creditors. 
 The confirmation of the plan by the court in accordance with Sec. 1129 
(a) (8) BC generally requires the approval of all creditor groups. However, the 
consent of individual groups of creditors - under certain conditions - in 
accordance with Sec. 1129 (b) BC can be replaced by the court. These are the 
so-called cram-down powers of the court. First of all it, is necessary that at least 
one affected group has agreed to the plan (Sec. 1129 (a) (10) BC) and that the 
plan does not contain “unfair discrimination“ of a certain group. It has to be “fair 
and equitable“.66 This competence includes, on the one hand, the largest 
influence of the court within the Chapter 9 proceedings and leads on the other 
hand to considerable losses and risks of the relevant creditors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The municipal debtor controls the plan and has the exclusive right to file it, McConnell / Picker, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 463. 
66  S Pryor, “When doing less is doing best“, 88 Am. Bankr. L. J. 85, 114 et seq. (hereinafter 
Pryor, 88 Am. Bankr. L. J. 85), examines some crucial bankruptcy confirmation issues: What 
protections do the two requirements of "fair and equitable" and no "unfair discrimination" and the 
mandate of "best interests of creditors"  provide for creditors? And what does it mean that a 
municipal  plan of adjustment must not propose actions prohibited by law? Finally, what should 




 If the plan has the approval of all creditor groups, or has been replaced by 
the court in the sense of the "cram-down power" in particular cases, and the 
plan does not violate applicable law, Sec. 943 (b) (7) BC requires as a last 
condition for the certification by the court, that the plan is “feasible“ and in the 
“best interest“ of creditors.67 The latter condition is primarily used to ensure a 
minimum standard for the protection of the outvoted within a group of consenting 
creditors. 
 In contrast to the Chapter 11 proceedings in which the rate from a 
hypothetical liquidation proceeding is taken as a yardstick for the "best interests 
tests", the creditor should not be subjected to worse conditions under the terms 
of the reorganisation plan than when performing a liquidation proceeding. The 
rule of thumb in the "best interests test" in the Chapter 9 proceedings is that all 
creditors must be paid as much as can be expected under the certain 
circumstances. This specific nature of the Chapter 9 proceedings lies in the fact 
that the liquidation of a municipal debtor is excluded from the first. Therefore a 
hypothetical liquidation quota is hardly detectable and comparison in this regard 
makes little sense. Thus the "best interests test" in the course of the Chapter 9 
proceedings includes a proportionality test in the discretion of the court under 
consideration of the specific interests of the creditors and the debtor. The 
insolvency plan is also feasible and therefore realistic if the municipality 
presumably can make the specified payments to the creditors without sacrificing 
the necessary exercise of public functions.68 
 The court must confirm the plan if it corresponds to the conditions set 
forth herein, Sec. 943 (b) BC.69 It is then for the debtor and all creditors, 
including those who have not agreed to the draft plan, to make it binding (Sec. 
944 (a) (3) BC). If the court, however, vetos the draft plan and does not confirm 
it, the proceeding is terminated, and the debtor must, as far as he is willing to do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For a detailed description of the feasibility jurisdiction compare S Pryor, “Who Bears the 
Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal  Residents in Chapter 9“, 37 Campbell L. Rev. 
160, 175 et. sqq. (hereinafter Pryor, 37 Campbell L. Rev. 160). 
68 RL Epling, “Fine tuning Chapter 9 municipal debt adjustments“, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 403, 420. 
69 For a detailed description of the plan confirmation compare JM Moringiello, “Chapter 9 Plan 
Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choices“, 37 Campbell L. Rev. 72, especially 76 




so, submit a modified or new plan. 
 
e) Discharge of residual debt 
 
 According to Sec. 944 (b) BC, discharge of residual debts of the debtor of 
a Chapter 9 proceeding requires, in addition to the confirmation of the 
insolvency plan by the court, that the debtor deposit all that is to be distributed 
under the plan at a authorized representative selected by court. The court then 
determines that the securities provided by the debtor are sufficient and provide 
legally binding precautions for payment or for securing the payment.   
After the discharge, the court shall exercise its responsibility as long as it is 
necessary to successfully implement the insolvency plan, Sec. 945 (a) BC. 
According to Sec. 945 (b) BC, it terminates the process by order, if the 
implementation of the insolvency proceedings is completed. 
 
3. Summary of Procedural aspects 
 
 As been shown, the Chapter 9 proceedings - different than the purpose of 
the reorganisation proceedings under Chapter 11 – are not first and foremost 
dedicated to the achievement of a consensus between debtors and creditors. 
Rather, the numerous discrepancies in the procedural rules in Chapter 9 ensure 
that the special needs of the municipal debtor come to the fore. The aim of the 
Chapter 9 proceedings is therfore the financial rehabilitation of public debtors, 
coupled with the ongoing maintenance of the fulfillment of their necessary public 
duties. The ensuring of a balance between the legitimate interests of both 
parties is not in the focus anymore. In other words, in many cases, the creditor 
must cut back so that the independent nature of the municipal debtor which is to 








III.  Chapter 9 as a model for other jurisdictions 
 
 As already indicated in the introduction, these days the question that 
arises in a variety of countries is whether municipal bankruptcy in general and 
the Chapter 9 proceeding in concrete actually represents a sensible policy for 
dealing with the difficulties of distressed municipalities. In other words, can 
municipalities benefit from filing in the same way that commercial corporations 
and private citiziens do? The prevailing answer to this question, at least in the 
American, but also in non-American legal literature, seems to be yes. Scholars 
that address this issue increasingly in recent years tend to focus on municipal 
bankruptcy as the remedy for local fiscal crises. Some scholars criticize the 
current Chapter 970, while others take a more favorable approach, but the 
underlying assumption of this article is that municipal insolvency should be dealt 
with through bankruptcy law.71 
 
1. Semantic Preamble - From Insolvency to “Resolvency“ 
 
a) The Stigma of Bankruptcy 
 
 Particularly in times of financial and economic crisis the Insolvency Law 
received steadily increasing attention not only in research and practice, but also 
in public. This is accompanied by a flood of modernization proposals in the orbit 
of the existing insolvency law, as well as with regard to the municipal insolvency 
discussed here. But supposedly progressive reform efforts must not obscure 
that the insolvency law regularly emerges as a return to old legal concepts with 
a new look. This is why the present case is important because traditional notions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Significant criticism in American Literature of Chapter 9 has been in recent years that the 
burden of municipal restructuring had been mostly borne by the citizens and especially the 
municipal employees. In particular, they had to suffer massive pension cuts in many processes 
in the course of the insolvency plan. 
However, this criticism will not be discussed in more detail below, as this seems to be a uniquely 
American problem that is less anchored in the structure of Chapter 9 proceedings, but rather in 
its practical application in individual cases. For a more detailed presentation, see in particular: 
Beermann, 41 Fordham Urb. L.J. 999. 




often have the stamina to block innovation experiments permanently although 
tehy work towards the public welfare. In effect, this is the talk of the 
psychological phenomenon of the "stigma of bankruptcy".72 
 Notwithstanding any remedial options, which the bankruptcy law now 
provides, the term of bankruptcy is a taboo, at least in the European context, not 
only with regard to public authorities, because presumably it is still flawed. In the 
context of an impending insolvency, the view has always been addressed on the 
economic failure of the debtor and the impending loss of demand of creditors, 
but the possibility of a fresh start is, if at all, only second in line.  
 In the course of time, the associated, internalized, moral condemnation of 
insolvency can thereby be demonstrated with examples from the literature, but 
also in actual legal rules and events in the past and present. 
 A current example here also represents the Greek crisis and the subsequent 
efforts to establish a permanent protection shield for over-indebted European 
countries and the intensification of the EU stability pact. In this context, the 
German government under Angela Merkel, as already mentioned, demaned in 
the first instance a international insolvency / brankuptcy procedure for states. 
Half a year later, the government only refered to this approach as a "crisis 
mechanism" that should allow an orderly debt settlement and settle the liability 
and private creditors in the event of bankruptcy.73 Ultimately, they wanted to 
establish an insolvency proceeding in a broader sense, but apparently that term 
should be avoided at all costs. 
 
 In the private environment, the "stigma of bankruptcy" even to this day 
often means that, as prominent examples prove, insolvent debtors often see no 
other choice than to commit suicide because they sense their bankruptcy as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 For a detailed discussion of the development of the „stigma of bankruptcy“ and its 
development within the Insolvency law refer to Hoffmann, The orderly insolvency of territorial 
entities using the example of German municipalities, p. 212 et. sqq. . 
73 "And we all are ready, including Germany, to say that we now need a permanent crisis 






libel. They consider themselves to be stigmatized.74 The economic death was 
and is, shockingly, still often at the same time the social death because it leads 
in many places, at least perceived subjectively, to condemnation of the debtor 
and his family. 
 Ultimately already the etymology of the word "bankrupt" clarifies almost 
metaphorically the moral stigma associated: The term (Italian: banca rotta, 
"broken or empty bank") is from the moneylenders or moneychangers in 
medieval northern Italy.75 These sat on Sundays in front of the church on small 
benches and actuated their financial transactions. Could one of those 
moneylenders not make his payments anymore, his bank was broken, this was 
then consequently a "banca rotta". So the shame of the moneylender was 
publicized and demonstrated that he was no longer allowed to operate on the 
market from now on. 
 It is not incomprehensible that over a long period of time, the obvious 
reaction to the refusal of performance of the debtor was punishment. After all, he 
had not kept his promise to pay. Therefore it is also hardly surprising that the 
debtor once had no rights. This is especially expressed in the Roman Twelve 
Table law dating back to 451 BC: 
 
“When a debt has been acknowledged or a judgment has been pronounced in 
court, 30 days must be the legitimate grace period. Thereafter, arrest of the 
debtor may be made by the laying on of hands. Bring him into court. If he does 
not satisfy the judgment (or no one in court offers himself as surety on his 
behalf) the creditor may take the debtor with him. He may bind him either in 
stocks or fetters, with a weight of no less than 15 lbs. (or more if he desires)." 
[After 60 days in custody, the case is returned to the court, and if the debt is not 
then paid, the debtor can be sold abroad as a slave, or put to death.]“76 
 
Therefore, it should not be underrated that it is considered a great achievment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For Example Paul Bhattacharjee, who starred in James Bond film Casino Royale and 
EastEnders, was declared bankrupt just days before he took his own life at cliffs in East Sussex. 
“He was also a "proud" man who would not have wanted the bankruptcy becoming public 
knowledge, his partner Emma McKie said.“, The Telegraph (14/11/2013), available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/10449893/James-Bond-actor-Paul-Bhattacharjee-declared 
bankrupt-before-suicide.html (last accessed: 20/5/2015). 
75 Online etymology dictionary www.etymonline.com (last accessed: 20/5/2015). 




Roman law 350 years later that it moved from the personal execution on to the 
real execution and thus averted the primary act of revenge and instead moved 
the access to the assets to the fore. Thus the first breakthrough for modern 
insolvency law was the so-called "missio in bona".77 
 But the revenge aspect has not yet been completely removed, because 
the imposition of „infamia“, the social ostracism, was connected with the 
implementation of bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the insolvency was still per se 
a criminal behavior because the debtor had disparaged himself by supposedly 
bad economies regardless because of his fault or because of bad luck and 
therfore innocent. This very personal „infamia“ is to this day - albeit mostly only 
subconsciously perceived – the "stigma of bankruptcy" which was found to 
modern times in almost all insolvency laws. 
 At the time when Christ was born the "cessio bonorum", i.e., the ability of 
the debtor to be released from „infamia“ by voluntary surrender of all goods had 
been introduced. However, the result was not necessarily a reduction of scorn. 
Thus, at least a scorn attribute usually was not waived  - be it the obligation to 
appear naked in public at a city’s famous place to announce the assignment of 
his property, or by wearing a green or white cap or by the order, to appear 
bareheaded and with completely open clothes before the judge. 
 The "stigma of bankruptcy" persisted. Whoever could not satisfy his 
creditors, for whatever reason, was widely equated with an impostor: "Fallitit 
sunt et deceptores fraudatores". Accordingly, for instance, the Augsburg criminal 
code from 1571 imposed extensive humiliations and thereby gives testimony 
about the general view of the time, according to which the mere fact of 
bankruptcy proceedings is slanderous:  
 
"Who is in bankruptcy, must go at the end of funerals and weddings and must 
be placed next to the women or remain at home." 
 
 In the 19th century, the strict medieval mores gave way to a refined type 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





of penalty. The merging of insolvency and fraud was abandoned in favor of a 
moral evaluation, but it still revealed the "stigma of bankruptcy" and called on 
the honor of an honest businessman: 
 
"(...) that any insolvent businessmann the full enjoyment of civil and political 
rights should be denied until he has reached a formal rehabilitation, caused by 
the complete satisfaction of his creditors. This view is deeply rooted in the 
conditions of the trading class. Every honest trader will feel complained in his 
conscience and will consider its reputation to be impaired as long as he has to 
carry the consciousness to have failed to fulfill its obligations. The punctual 
payment of any debt liabilities is the essential condition of the personal loan and 
this in turn is one of the main foundations of commercial honor; Both 
requirements are necessary shaken by the outbreak of bankruptcy. "78 
 
b) The paradigm shift 
 
 It is hardly surprising that in view of such a constant tradition of 
condemnation, an at least psychological stigma of insolvency is still mentioned 
today, which is not conducive to the evaluation of a municipal bankruptcy in the 
first place. In the Middle Ages, bankruptcy had shameful and slanderous 
consequences, even earlier, life and limb-threatening consequences. Just 100 
years ago the debtor - at least in Europe – had to face within the legal system an 
expressly laid defined, moral disapproval. 
 Although the present legal system usually refrains from a moral 
assessment of insolvency, it is still common among the widespread population 
to avoid a bankrutcy scenario at all costs because of this traditional stigma. The 
remedial options of insolvency proceedings often disappear in today‘s stigma of 
bankruptcy and attract scant interest. It is even more interesting in this context 
that the relevant discussion in the insolvency law is dominated for years by the 
question of a particular debtor‘s friendly redevelopment option as part of the 
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orderly bankruptcy, and in this context a new "Insolvency culture" or a "change 
of mentality" is required to see the mechanisms of insolvency law even more as 
an opportunity for a fresh start. For quite some time the bankruptcy procedure 
itself has had no prescribed method of personal discrimination or even 
punishment yet social stigma still remains. 
 A more drastic paradigm shift seems scarcely conceivable - from 
ostracism and draconian punishment towards the rescue and reorganization of 
the debtor. Therefore, the Insolvency Law is in development towards an 
economically oriented, independent method for an economically meaningful 
cleanup of insolvency. The fear of contact with bankruptcy reorganisation is 
unfounded. It is instead a chance and opportunity for a "fresh start". Specifically, 
this means the opportunity to shed ballast and to change outdated structures. 
The suspected effects of bankruptcy as a "death penalty of civil law" at the 
beginning of the 20th century, which destroyed the economic survival of the 
bankrupt in a legal way of bankruptcy, are no longer true in today's Insolvency 
law. Rather the Bankruptcy initiates now the possibility of a "process of creative 
destruction". 
 Noteworthy in this regard are the historical reasons for the emergence of 
alternative rehabilitation under Bankruptcy Law. The crucial factor for that was 
not a well-intentioned altruism of creditors towards the debtor, but simply the 
recognition that  in many cases, the liquidation of the debtor's assets was not 
profitable and that the reorganisation of the debtor could be for creditors‘ benefit.  
At this point, a quick look into the past is worthwhile again. As noted above, the 
Roman Emperor Augustus enacted at the beginning of the 1st century the Lex 
Iulia, which - first of all – gave the Senators the opportunity by  the "cessio 
bonorum" to escape from “infamia“, despite bankruptcy. The liberation of the 
senators from the stigma of infamy allowed them to remain Rome as senators. 
Apparently, Augustus could no longer afford to lose senators because of the 
social ostracism of bankruptcy. A trigger for basic insolvency law changes to 
protect the debtor is so often the mundane fact that the unreflective use of 
conventional mechanisms can no longer be afforded. 




municipal authority bows out of the exercise of public funtions. The orderly, 
scheduled bankruptcy under Chapter 9 is intended primarily to disarm the 
(financial) existential threat of local authorities as a responsible body of state 
tasks. 
 
c) From liquidation of the debtor's assets to the debtors restructuring 
 
 The bankruptcy was dominated for centuries by the liquidation, i.e., the 
destruction of the debtor's assets and the payment of creditors from the sale 
proceeds. 
Even if the creditor today decides to take the road of liquidation of the debtor's 
assets, the liquidator shall continue the task of selling the debtor's assets and 
distributing the sale proceeds as part of the statutory order to the creditors. A 
main objection to the application of insolvency legislation on legal persons of 
public law in general, and local authorities in particular, and thus decisive 
argument for the non-insolvency ability of those entities, is consequently always 
that the insolvency proceedings are aimed at the liquidation and termination of 
the (economic) existence of the debtor. This conclusion contradicts the public 
interest of the municipalities, because the local authority can no longer fulfill its 
public duties after liquidation. Thus, bankruptcy is not a solution for distressed 
municipalities in the form of the liquidation proceedings. 
 But this objection is unfounded because of the current possibilities of 
insolvency proceedings and especially in view of the specific form of Chapter 9 
proceedings.  Rather, the main objection against the implementation of legal 
regulations on insolvency for insolvent public authorities - the State cannot be 
liquidated – is now largely pointless. 
 The initial situation which always underlies insolvency law remains 
unchanged. There is a debtor and at least one creditor who cannot be satisfied 
by the former. Ostensibly, the next closely associated reaction pattern is always 
the access to the debtor's assets and its liquidation or utilisation for the purpose 
of subsequent distribution of proceeds among the creditors. The possibility of 




stigma of bankruptcy. There is the scenario manifested that describes the 
economic and sometimes social Exitus and should therefore be avoided as far 
as possible. But in addition to the process of the liquidation of the debtor's 
assets, there also occurs the ability to reorganise the debtor. Creditors should 
be given the option to not just attain at least proportionate satisfaction of their 
claims by the mere liquidation of the debtor's assets, but to bring the debtor 
back to a succesful market participation. In addition, the honest debtor is given a 
chance to get rid of its remaining liabilities. Thus insolvency proceedings are 
now also in the interests of the debtor. For centuries, insolvency law was almost 
only about the ostracism and punishment of the debtor, but nowdays, the 
attention that comes to the fore is how insolvency law can assist the debtor in 
the restructuration - a more comprehensive paradigm shift is hard to imagine. 
 The reorganisation of the debtor in the US was first established in the 
mid-19th century. Decisive at that time was the financial incapacity of some 
railway companies. The state was so dependent on these companies that a 
simple liquidation was not possible. Consequently, it allowed them a debt 
adjusted restart. 
 Today, the possibility of bankruptcy reorganisation in a private legal 
environment proves particularly in the tertiary sector, i.e., the service sector, as 
a blessing. In the event of insolvency, there can be found little assets for 
liquidation. Typical values of the tertiary sector as expertise, customer base or 
social skills are very tied to the persons concerned so that it can be difficult to 
quantify and even more difficult to sell. The creditor is therefore not helped with 
a mere liquidation, but the debtor must be given the opportunity, to successfully 
participate again in the economy. 
 A relevant aspect of the proceedings is then usually the reorganisation of 
the debtor. In this way, the prospect is opened that the previously stigma 
afflicted insolvency can be used as a chance for remediation. By no means does 
this require an altruistic demeanor of the creditors, since the rehabilitation of the 
financialy striken debtor is in their own economic interest. Thus, the private law 
practice and the Chapter 9 proceedings evolved a mechanism in the event of 






2. Experience with the mechanisms of the Chapter 9 procedure 
 
 There is very extensive experience with the insolvency of sub-national 
authorities/municipalities under the regime of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Since 1937, approximately 550 cases have been documented, only half of which 
occurred in the years 1937-1950. Until 2008, relatively few municipalities had to 
choose the path of debt discharge on the Chapter 9 proceedings (2006: 5; 2007: 
6; 2008: 4), however, the economic and financial crisis of 2008 increased the 
usage of these proceedings by the American municipailities. 
 The causes for municipal insolvency in the United States were and are 
multifarious. They range from inept financial management, lack of government 
control, financing from unreliable sources of revenue and changes in the 
economic environment to political and general social factors. Equally diverse are 
the consequences of illiquidity and thus the trigger of the Chapter 9 proceedings. 
One municipality was not able to execute their required pension payments, the 
other no longer had sufficient resources to finance the police - not even enough 
emergency personnel was available. Although muncipial crises are usually 
distinguished by slow and steplike economic degeneration, municipal 
bankruptcy filings were also often caused by a one-time sudden exogenous 
event.79 This event created a solvency problem that finally resulted in 
bankruptcy. “In many cases, the event that led to the filing was simply the loss of 
a large lawsuit. The locality did not have the resources to pay the awarded 
damages and had to file for bankruptcy“.80 
 Interestingly, in the past most of the municipalities that did file for Chapter 
9 were very small. The average size of those municipalities was about 1000 
residents, and most of the municipalities that filed had less than 10,000 
residents. Although larger cities, including metropolises such as New York, 
Miami, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. also experienced serious financial 
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problems, with a few notable exceptions, such as Orange County, they did not 
file for bankruptcy.81 Municipal bankruptcy seemed to appeal more to small 
towns than to the average or large city.82 As mentioned in the introduction that 
phenomenon changed in recent times. The past few years have seen a 
drumbeat of bankruptcy filings of average and large cities: Jefferson County, 
Alabama; Central Falls83, Rhode Island; Harrisburg84, Pennsylvania; Stockton, 
California; and San Bernardino, California. In other words, a flurry of Chapter 9 
filings, with the case of Detroit as a temporary peak, called this apparently 
settled wisdom into question.85   
 
3. Chapter 9 as component of a comprehensive municipal financial 
recovery plan 
 
 Scholars who have written about municipal bankruptcy in the past twenty 
years often “approach Chapter 9 and state intervention in municipal financial 
affairs as alternatives rather than complementary components of a 
comprehensive municipal financial recovery plan“.86 From that point of view, as 
Moringiello mentions, they compare Chapter 9 especially to Chapter 11, and 
then conclude that because Chapter 9 does not contain all of the Chapter 11 
checks on debtor behaviour, it cannot adequately promote the financial 
rehabilitation of a sizable general-purpose municipality and is thus an 
unrequested alternative to a state intervention. This approach disregards the 
original aim of Congress in enacting a municipal bankruptcy law after the Great 
Depression.87  
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 Moringiello argues, that when Congress passed the predecessor to 
Chapter 9, it did so in order to bring together two sovereigns, the state and the 
federal government, to achieve the imposition of a plan to adjust municipal 
financial liabilities that would be binding on all creditors of the municipality, 
wherever located. Chapter 9 bankruptcy therefore was designed to supplement, 
not to replace, state financial intervention plans.88 Constitutional concerns, 
coupled with municipal bankruptcy's original limited aim of solving the holdout 
problem, explain the essence of Chapter 9. As Morinigiello mentions, Chapter 9 
limits the control that a federal court can exercise over a municipality, and the 
Contracts Clause limits the ability of a state to force a creditor of a municipality 
to accept less than what it is owed.89 “As a result, although today's Chapter 9 is 
modeled more closely on Chapter 11 than were its predecessor statutes, it lacks 
many of the elements of Chapter 11 that give creditors some control over the 
debtor.“90  
 The framework of Chapter 9 seems to grant the public authorities of a 
municipality in Chapter 9 exclusive control of the municipality's future fortune. 
This and no more is the objective of Chapter 9 proceedings. By contrast, this 
should not and cannot alone afford the Chapter 9 municipal finances extensive 
refurbishment. Chapter 9 was never designed to provide a extensive scheme to 
solve (structural) municipal financial problems. It was in fact designed to 
supplement state endeavours to solve those problems. A municipal insolvency 
proceeding doesnt`t have more options because it can only react to individual 
municipal financial difficulties. For that reason, Chapter 9 does indeed anticipate 
reorganisation governance over a municipal debtor, but in the hands of the 
state, not in the hands of a bankruptcy court or under the influence of the 
creditors.91 “Chapter 9 may only be as effective as each state's plan for 
municipal fiscal oversight. This conclusion does, however, allow researchers 
and policy makers to focus on the role of each state in developing an effective 
mechanism to not only resolve the financial distress of its municipalities but 
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develop sensible structures for their municipalities going forward. This 
mechanism should include both robust state oversight and the safety valve of 
Chapter 9 if necessary to overcome holdout creditors.“92 
 Therefore, the criticism is unfounded when some scholars deny 
effectiveness and meaningfulness of a insolvency proceedings for municipalities 
in general or the Chapter 9 proceeding in concrete terms, because it cannot 
solve (structural) municipal payments crises. The Chapter 9 process is in fact 
not designed to do this alone. Rather it is and it must be part of a 
comprehensive mechanism for ensuring a (structural) municipal sound financial 
situation. In the opinion of the author, this is imperative. 
 
4. Singular debt settlement  vs. Long term reorganisation 
 
 Omer Kimhi asks: „Bankruptcy no doubt helps the city with its short-term 
liquidity problems, but does it present a viable solution for dealing with fiscal 
problems of municipalities? He answers that question with a resounding "No", 
because the corporate bankruptcy process, on which municipal bankruptcy is 
based, is designed solely to address the problems of financially, as opposed to 
economically, distressed debtors. He argues that Chapter 9 can`t provide a cure 
for the problems of distressed municiaplities.  
 Municipal corporations are designed to supply public goods. They provide 
essential services to their residents (services such as police and fire protection, 
education, and water and sewage), and the provision of these services must 
continue even when a locality is facing serious financial difficulties. In his 
opinion, it is the residents' right to receive adequate services from the 
government, and this right persists notwithstanding a local fiscal crisis.93 From 
this he concludes: First, it is in the context of insolvency proceedings hardly 
possible to liquidate assets of the municipality, because it is mandatory for the 
exercise of public functions. Second, the exercise of public functions can be 
guaranteed only if the structural and socio-economic reasons of local financial 
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difficulties are solved. Local authorities regularly don’t have to face self-inflicted 
financial difficulties, because they simply meet their public obligations and 
functions.  However, this problem can not be solved by the Chapter 9 
proceedings; rather, it is a purely short-term mechanism to restore the solvency 
of the municipalitiy. For that reason, he argues that only a proactive supervision 
system of local finance by the state can help rehabilitate distressed 
municipalities, and, even more importantly, it can help prevent local fiscal 
problems from becoming a crisis. In order to efficiently supervise local finances, 
the state should evaluate the localities' condition on an ongoing basis. To the 
extent the state concludes that a certain locality has entered into financial 
distress, it then creates a special state board that monitors the distressed 
locality more closely. The board, comprised of several state representatives, 
prepares a rehabilitation plan that includes both actions on the part of the locality 
(in particular, cost cutting) and actions on the part of the state (such as tax 
reforms or state aid). The board then follows the implementation of the plan, and 
if the process is successful, the city will be able to recover.94 
 He points out that unless otherwise stipulated in the state's constitution, 
the state can take any action with regard to its local governments, whereas the 
lmunicipalities have only those competences delegated to them by the state. 
These state powers, combined with the fact that the state controls a larger 
geographical area than each of its cities, enable the state to better address the 
problems faced by cities. 
 However, it must be noted here that Kimhi drastically underestimates the 
influence of local political reasons for the financial situation of municipalities. 
Additionally, he is mistaken when he says that the entire municipal assets are 
not recoverable, since this serves solely mandatory and rational public functions. 
Internal political circumstances play a dominant role regarding the finacial 
situation of almost every distressed municipality. Quite often reckless and 
sometimes even corrupt politicians implement unwise financial and accounting 
practices, which eventually result in financial calamity.95 
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           Although many assets can not be liquidated in the course of municipal 
bankruptcy, this does not apply to all assets. Therefore, as mentioned above, 
the Chapter 9 proceedings differentiate explicitly in this aspect. Last but not 
least, there is a major constitutional and democratic problem with a proactive 
supervision system – and Kimhi mentions this problem without solving it: The 
coin with which the municipality pays for the state supervision is a temporary 
loss of its local autonomy due to the state's intervention in its local affairs. 
During the time a board is in place, the locality must comply with the board's 
instructions, and the local officials may be prohibited from taking certain actions. 
The infringement on the local autonomy is particularly problematic – and that 
seems to be not acceptable from a democratic point of view - because the board 
members are nominated and not elected by the residents. The board members 
are not politically accountable to any constituency, and are not required to 
respect the residents' constitutional rights and the correspondend duty of the 
municipal for public goods and services. 
 Thus, Kimhi is correct when he sends a reminder that structural problems 
in municipal financial resources need to be addressed, but this does not 
automatically deny the Chapter 9 proceedings its right to exist and its capability 
for a constitutional recovery of a disstressed municipality. Instead, it can and 
must go hand in hand with broader reforms and the resolution of socio-economic 
difficulties. 
 
5. Can insolvency proceedings solve political problems? 
 
 Some scholars argue that “bankruptcy is poorly designed to solve political 
problems“96. They worry that bankruptcy law invites serial bankruptcy filings 
without facing the  real problems of the municipality.97 There definitely is an 
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element of truth to this objection. The capacity of a insolvency proceeding to 
restructure a municipals public operations is limited. Chapter 9 cannot displace 
municipal executives or dictate municipal public policy.98 But this does not 
implies that an insolvency proceeding has no effect. In other words, the 
possibility that insolvency proceedings might not always solve the municipal’s 
stress is not a good argument to forego its use at all. 
 Even if Chapter 9 cannot solve a political crisis, it helps to come up 
against some structural problems in municipal finance. “One obvious political 
dysfunction is the tendency to over-rely on borrowed funds. Borrowing enables 
politicians to spend the money in the short term - often on a popular project - 
while deferring the costs to the future. If bankruptcy increases the likelihood that 
a municipality will restructure its obligations and decreases the likelihood of a 
federal bailout in the event of severe financial distress, it could counteract 
politicians' short-term incentives on the margin.“99  
The mere existence of municipal insolvency proceedings changes the behavior 
of lenders, which impacts on lending, collateralisation and interests, as the 
lender must expect a certain risk of default of the granted credit.100 The 
immediate consequence is that borrowers have to pay higher interest with 
gradually increasing debt and will not get any new loans in the more extreme 
cases.101 These instruments of interest increase and credit rationing is not the 
expression of a market failure, but rather disciplinary mechanism for otherwise 
irresponsible acting borrowers. Debt financing would be slightly more expensive, 
which would alienate its use, especially as municipal fortunes declined.102 
Municipal debtors have the chance to present themselves in good shape on the 
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credit markets and represent their means transparent.103 Thus, the Chapter 9 
proceeding is not only effective, but also a law-saving debt settlement tool. It 
rewards reasonable municipalities with an interest rate reduction and punishes 
untrustworthy and low-sustainable municipalities with a potentially sensitive 
higher interest rate. This is done solely on the natural mechanisms of the credit 
market and requires no law and no intervention of political actors. The credit 
market itself moves the municipalities to a sustainable fiscal policy. Also, 
“consumer debtors tend to overemphasize the short-term benefits of borrowing 
and to underestimate the long-term costs“.104 Chapter 9 cannot fix these 
problems. Unlike a corporation, whose managers can be ousted, an insolvency 
proceeding cannot force a municipality to make better decisions. But it can help 
them to reorganise debt if it becomes entirely unsustainable and give the 
debtor's creditors an incentive to monitor their decisionmaking.105  Thus it can be 
said that both creditors and debtors benefit from the ex-ante efficiency of the 
Chapter 9 proceedings.  
 
6. Chance for a fresh start vs. Moral hazard!? 
 
 Some scholars106 repeat the objection that because all Chapter 9 does is 
grant a fresh start to a municipality, it is not a beneficial reorganisation 
instrument.107 Those who enunciate this objection argue that Chapter 9 provides 
no operational restructuring. McConnell and Picker, who wrote the often quoted 
municipal bankruptcy article “When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction 
to Municipal Bankruptcy“, criticised the limited aims of Chapter 9 and its efficacy 
in accomplishing those aims. They postulate that Chapter 9 is based on the 
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belief that "all the cities need is relief from their present creditors."108 From that 
background, they argue that because Chapter 9 presumes that "the city will 
emerge from bankruptcy in the same form . . . with which it entered bankruptcy," 
Chapter 9 does neither support nor encourage the efficient reorganisation of 
municipalities.109  As a result, municipal bankruptcy could only provide a fresh 
start for municipalities, “and it does not even do that very well because by 
allowing a city to keep all of its assets and discharge its debts, it creates the 
moral hazard110 of permitting a city to devote its resources to itself while 
escaping its debts.“111 
 But those authors make a mistake by describing state intervention and 
federal municipal bankruptcy as parallel independent systems.112 For example 
McConnell and Picker demonstrated that explicitly by describing bankruptcy as 
"an alternative to state reform rather than supplemental to it."113 This perspective 
of Chapter 9 and state intervention as reciprocal exclusive alternatives is 
compatible with some scholars' characterisation of Chapter 9 as a way for a 
municipality to receive easy debt dispention without making the necessary 
changes to provide essential services and avoid financial distress in the 
future.114 If that would be the case, Chapter 9, of course, would be undesirable. 
No one wants a municipality to go through the damages and bad press of 
bankruptcy just to emerge from bankruptcy in the same distressed form in which 
it entered.115  
 In a perfect world, a state could prevent and ameliorate the financial 
distress of its cities without resorting to federal law. The world is not perfect, 
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however.116 In the United States, there is no general liability of the relevant 
states for their cities and towns.117 Nevertheless, the state often takes voluntary 
care of municipalities with financial difficulties and in some cases covers for the 
insolvent municipalities due to the possible negative impact on the overall 
interest of the state. If this is not the case, the proceedings under Chapter 9 
open up the option of debt settlement for municipalities. The specific 
authorization requirement to file for Chapter 9 “gives the states a gatekeeper 
role by allowing the states to choose whether, and under what conditions, their 
municipalities can file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. By granting the states this 
gatekeeper role, the Congress not only exercised care to ensure that the 
municipal bankruptcy chapter passed constitutional muster, it also provided a 
mechanism for state participation in the federal bankruptcy process.“118 The 
authorisation precondition is a governance control that reflects the “hybrid fresh 
start-rehabilitation goal“119 of Chapter 9. All Chapter 9 can do on its own is give 
debt dispensation. Combined with state intervention, however, Chapter 9 can 
both give debt relief and facilitate municipal rehabilitation.120 
 Every municipality that files for bankruptcy has insufficient revenues to 
meet its expenses. Of course, a bankruptcy filing cannot fix the income problem, 
but it can enable a municipality to decrease its expenses.121 Along the way, the 
municipality can fulfill their necessary public functions without significant 
intervention by the court and especially without the risk of enforcement by the 
creditors ("automatic stay"). This means that the Chapter 9 proceedings prove at 
least with respect to its target bearing a notable example in dealing with 
municipal insolvency scenarios. The debtor will be helped by using the Chapter 
9 proceedings for a "breather" and thus opens up the opportunity to create a 
more stable financial fundament for the future. Through bankruptcy, the 
municipality is able to decrease its debt burden and its tax rates, and to enjoy a 
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fresh start that will hopefully increase its productivity and boost economic 
development.122 Consequently, the municipality improves the services it 
provides to its residents. Residents do not have to donate such a significant 
portion of their income to the city, and as a result they have a greater incentive 
to generate economic activity.123  
  Therfore, Chapter 9 is not designed to improve the creditors' collection 
remedies, but rather to help the municipality itself to rehabilitate. The 
"bankruptcy privileges" of Chapter 9 enables a municipality to pressure, or even 
to force, its creditors to waive part of its debts or at least to extend the debt's 
maturity date. However, this is not a new phenomenon of Chapter 9 
proceedings, but has already been created in the principles of any Insolvency 
act. Although the debtor has much less power in the bankruptcy proceedings for 
companies and individuals, the implementation of an insolvency proceeding 
nevertheless in most cases leads to significant losses for the creditors. 
The noticeably stronger postion of the municipal debtor in Chapter 9 
proceedings, due to its constitutional position, may increase this position in 
some cases. However, there are not completely new aspects arising. 
 Certainly, Chapter 9 was never designed to serve as a extensive regime 
to solve municipal financial distress on ist own, but it was intended to recruit 
state efforts and state intervention to solve those problems.124 For that reason, 
Chapter 9 supplies cities with comparatively easy debt dispensation. The 
municipality stays autonomous, while executing a debt restructuring plan from a 
position of strength. Due to these benefits, distressed municipalities can use 
Chapter 9 to handle financial distress. Filing for Chapter 9 allows the 
municipality to skake off at least part of its debts, and proceed to act with a 
reduced debt service. 
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7. Interim findings 
 
 Insolvent municipalities regain through a market-based "crisis 
mechanism" within the meaning of the Chapter 9 proceeding their political action 
and decision latitude and the local leaders are encouraged to more budgetary 
discipline, at least with a view to the future.  
The primary goal of the Chapter 9 proceedings is the settlement of the municipal 
debt of the past and thus the possibility of a debt-adjusted municipal fresh start. 
On no account is the extensive liquidation and thus dissolution of the municipal 
debtor intended. Purpose, and not just mere consequence of this debt 
settlement, is therefore the mandatory creditor participation. They are involved in 
the process to contribute - often in the form of at least proportionate loss of 
claims - to provide for the rehabilitation of the municipal debtor. This will serve, 
in the best case, to not only the solution of current municipal insolvency 
scenarios, but also the prevention of future cash crises and thus lead to a 
discipline of the creditors for the future, as these are required to elaborate the 
municipal creditworthiness. 
 The overall objective of Chapter 9 proceedings is the claim to transfer the 
municipal financial responsibility on the current players, which are in any case 
responsible for the present situation, and thus to make a step towards greater 
intergenerational equity. 
 
IV. Conclusion and perspective 
 
 The Chapter 9 proceeding has a long legal tradition, and is regarded as 
extremely successful in practice. Nevertheless, it has consistently experienced 
critisim. In recent times, this is less directed against the underlying approach of 
the proceedings rather than against the concrete implementation. Surprisingly, it 
may also be that the loss of the rights of the creditors, which corresponds to the 
additional freedoms of the municipal debtor, is given little importance. 
 But ultimately, the mechanisms of the Chapter 9 proceeding can only be 




public perception of insolvency as a serious tool for rehabilitation of the debtor 
wins recognition. It is of crucial importance in this context that insolvency is no 
longer stigmatized as an inevitable end of corporate or municipal activity, but is 
seen as an opportunity for a successful restart. The recent municipal 
bankruptcies have, in a sense, extended this market-oriented approach in two 
aspects. “First, they have signaled that Chapter 9 is indeed an option - and an 
alternative to rescue financing. The conventional wisdom that significant 
municipalities do not file for Chapter 9 is no longer accurate. Secondly, the 
scope of restructuring has expanded considerably.“125 As the American investor 
Warren Buffett has enunciated it, the stigma is disappearing.126 
 What is left of the former "stigma of insolvency" in modern insolvency law 
is, at most, the taint of economic or financial failure. However, a certain residual 
stain is quite desirable so that insolvency is not abused as a welcome tool to 
disengage from contractual obligations and to correct economic and financial 
mistakes. Anyway, this residual taint is suited to trigger a disciplining effect in 
the form of an “ex-ante“ efficiency. It is secured by long experience in insolvency 
law, that the existence of insolvency proceedings shows constraining effects for 
all involved. The mere reference to the enormous numbers of the annual 
insolvency statistics cannot weaken this knowledge: No insolvency law, and 
probably not any sort of legal system, can eliminate the phenomenon of 
"insolvency" entirely. However, it can reduce its occurrence. 
 
 By making a clear cut and attacking the debt problem head-on, the 
Chapter 9 proceedings transfers the responsibility and risk of non-recovery of 
the existing claims against the municipality to current players who bear the 
responsibility for the current debt situation in contrast to the future generation.127 
Thus, the Chapter 9 proceeding fulfills last but not least an important 
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contribution to intergenerational equity and sustainability.   
 The absence of the Chapter 9 proceeding would, however, mean that the 
municipalities could indeed not be insolvent in the formal sense, but would still 
be illiquid.128 On the one hand, this would entice the lenders of the municipalities 
to grant credit in economically unjustifiable extent and thus continues to drift into 
debt. On the other hand, distressed municipalities would increasingly fall to the 
state collective burden.  
Especially in economic regard, the Chapter 9 proceeding has thus a crucial task, 
not the least because delaying the solution of a debt problem causes other costs 
by the ever-increasing interest that makes the debts continue to grow. But the 
only sensible solution - the settlement of debts in the context of insolvency 
proceedings - is often mistakenly considered to be too expensive. This drives 
the claims of creditors in even higher dimensions, but they are thereby more 
recoverable by no means. A debt reduction can therefore be delayed, but 
ultimately not be prevented. 
 An early, more precisely on time conducted debt settlement is therefore 
economically advantageous. Someone who is overwhelmed by his debts, makes 
no contribution to debt reduction, but rather becomes a burden of the general 
public and future generations. 
 The allegation that the Chapter 9 proceeding interferes only later and at 
the most leads to the corrections but not to prevention of mistakes, has to be 
accused of lacking draft itself. Chapter 9 works especially by its existence rather 
than by its actual implementation. It forces the involved debtor and creditors to 
take precautions to prevent insolvency and develops its authoritative function 
especially with the incentive to avoid their actual occurrence. If those assets 
which are available in the event of insolvency are specified, as well as those that 
are essential to fulfill the public service mission, this automatically leads to a 
more careful handling of the participants. 
 Since the amount of the municipal debt is associated with the dispositive 
estate of the municipality, this often a triggers a local-public discussion on the 
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cost of municipal debt and increases the pressure on policy makers. If the local 
citizens are faced with the fact that in the case of municipal insolvency 
predominantly sporting, cultural and leisure facilities are under consideration, 
they realise that excessive and uncontrolled debt has a very direct impact on 
civic life. The democratic, especially in the results of the local elections reflected 
demand for a rethinking of the (debt) policy, is often the direct result. The 
concrete political responsibility is strengthened. Consequently, the municipal 
decision-makers need to make major consolidation efforts to avoid prestige 
injurious proceedings. 
 The often conjured risk of frivolous demands of the Chapter 9 
proceedings is relativised alone by the comparatively rare opening of 
proceedings in the United States. Far too much is the threat of loss of reputation 
of the municipal debtor, which has to face greatly increased costs on the captial 
market with the initiation of the proceedings. 
 Ultimately, however, it must be noted that regardless of how effective the 
discussed Chapter 9 proceeding is, it is certainly suitable to provide ordered 
structures only for individual local reorganisation in financial emergencies. If, 
however, already existing long-term structural crises of municipal financial 
structures should be prevented in the future, it can only happen through far-
reaching institutional reforms which can only be made by the states.129 The task 
of the Chapter 9 proceedings is therefore also to develop a problem awareness 
by the comprehensive and transparent analysis of municipal finances during the 
drafting of the insolvency plan and especially by the relentless exposure of the 
funding gaps in the performing part of the plan. Thus, the political decision 
makers are made aware of the structural weaknesses of the municipal finance 
system in general and in particular the under-funding of the transferred 
municipal responsibilities. Hereby, the Chapter 9 proceeding is not only 
conduced to a medium-term degradation of the individual municipal debt and the 
“resolvenzy“ of the concrete municipality, but also to the aim to take long-term 
steps for the reduction of the municipal debt in general. The aim of such reforms 
is not damage limitation in each individual case, but to ensure "healthy state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




finances" in general. 
 An insolvency proceedings for municipalities does not eliminate once and 
for all the problem of over-indebted municipalities, but much is gained if the 
phenomenon is reduced. Thus, the Chapter 9 proceeding and especially its 
underlying objectives carries the possibility of a model character for relevant 
regulations in other countries. Although a direct transfer of Chapter 9 will be 
neither possible nor advisable in other jurisdictions. However, it is worth – this 
was the aim of this survey- thinking about the implementation of individual 
elements of Chapter 9, in particular about the very existence and necessity of 
such an insolvency regime. This can, under certain circumstances, enforce the 
realisation that insolvency proceedings are reasonable and feasible not only at a 



























Anderson Michelle Wilde, Dissolving Cities (2012), 121 Yale L. J. 1364. 
 
Baird, Douglas, The elements of bankruptcy (1992), Foundation Press, New 
York. 
 
Beermann, Jack M., Esolving the public pension “crisis“ (2014), 41 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 999. 
 
Buccola, Vincent S. J., An ex ante approach to excessive state debt (2014), 64 
Duke L. J. 235. 
 
Cohen, Jeffrey, Declining health of U.S. Cities raises new interest in chapter 9 
(1991), National law journal, 15. 
 
Dahl, Ryan Preston, Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter 9 
Bankruptcy (2007), 81 Am. Bankr. L. J. 295. 
 
Dubrow, David L., Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A viable option for 
municipalities in fiscal crisis? (1992), The Urban Lawyer 539. 
 
Epling, Richard L., Fine tuning Chapter 9 municipal debt adjustments (1989), 21 
Ariz. St. L. J. 403. 
 
Gillette, Clayton P., Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of 
Municipal Bankruptcy (2012), 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281. 
 
Hoffmann, Maximilian, Die geordnete gebietskörperschaftliche Insolvenz am 
Beispiel deutscher Kommunen (The orderly insolvency of territorial entities using 




Jeweler, Robin, Municipal Reorganization: Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code 1-2 (2007), Cong. Research Serv., RL33924.  
 
Kimhi, Omer, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy  Code: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem (2010), 27 Yale J. on Reg. 351. 
 
Kimhi, Omer, Reviving cities: Legal remedies to municipal financial crises 
(2008), 88 B. U. L. Rev. 633. 
 
King. Lawrence P., Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy 
Act (1976), Duke L.J. 1157. 
 
Kratzmann, Horst, Der Staatsbankrott (The bankruotcy of the state) (1982), JZ 
1982, 319. 
 
Kupetz, David S., Municipal debt adjustment under the Bankruptcy Code (1995), 
The Urban Lawyer 531. 
 
Lam, Eric W. Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem With Chapter 9 Eligibility— A 
Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 Ariz St L J 625. 
 
Levitin, Adam J., Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy (2012), When 
States Go Broke,The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in 
Fiscal Crisis, Conti-Brown, Peter / David A. Skeel David A. (eds), Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Liu, Lili / Waibel, Michael, Subnational Insolvency : Cross-Country Experiences 
and Lessons (2008), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4496. 
 






McConnell, Michael W. / Picker, Randal C., Municipal Bankruptcies – how to 
handle a Chapter 9 from start to finish (1995), Practising  Law Institute, New 
York. 
 
McConnell, Michael W. / Picker, Randal C., When Cities Go Broke: A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy (1993), 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 425. 
 
Moringiello, Juliet M., Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards and the role of 
state choices (2015), 37 Campbell L. Rev. 72. 
 
Moringiello, Juliet M., Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy (2014), 71 
Wash & Lee L. Rev. 403. 
 
Moringiello, Juliet M., Bankruptcy and beyond: Exploring the causes of and the 
solutions to municipal financial distress: Introduction (2015), 24 Widener L.J. 1. 
 
O'Brien Hylton, Maria, Central Falls retiress v. bonholders: Assessing fear of 
contagion in Chapter 9 proceedings (2013), 59 Wayne L. Rev. 525. 
 
Paulus, Christoph G., Gemeinden und Insolvenzrecht: eine nützliche Allianz 
(Municipalities and Insolvency Law: A beneficial Alliance (2014), ZInsO 2014, 
2464. 
 
Pollard, Randle B., Bankruptcy and beyond: Exploring the causes of and 
solutions to municipal financial distress: Feeling insecure – As state view of 
wether investores in municipal general obligation bonds have a mere promise to 
pay or a binding obligation (2015), 24 Widener L. J. 19. 
 
Pryor, Scott, Municipal bankruptcy: When doing less is doing best (2014), 88 






Pryor, Scott, Who Bears the Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal  
Residents in Chapter 9 (2015), 37 Campbell L. Rev. 160. 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M. / Rogoff, Kenneth, This times is different: Eight centuries of 
financial folly (2009), Princeton University Press. 
 
Skeel, David A., Is bankruptcy the answer for troubled cities and states? (2013), 
50 Hous. L. Rev. 1063. 
 
Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776), vol. II, Glasgow edition of R. H. Campell / A. S. Skinner / W. B. Todd, 
Oxford 1979. 
 
Stuart, Jacqueline B., Municipal bankruptcy: A Chapter 9 primer (1995), Journal 
of Commercial Lending 46. 
 
Tung, Frederick, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal 
Bankruptcy  Law (2002), 53 Hastings L. J. 885. 
 
Vassallo, Anne Marie, Note, Solving Camden's Crisis: Makeover or Takeover? 
(2001), 33 Rutgers L. J. 185.  
 
	  
 
